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Local Public Employees Right To Strike
After County Sanitation District v.
Los Angeles County Employees
Association
Prior to 1945, public employees were generally better off than
their counterparts in the private sector. The job security of public
employees was greater than that of private employees and public
employees enjoyed comparable, if not superior, wages and fringe
benefits.' Public employees pursued their group interest through
associations and leagues whose typical function was to lobby for
favorable civil service laws, pay scales, and fringe benefits.2 After
World War II, however, private sector unions made substantial ad-
vances in gaining improved wages and benefits for private sector
employees. 3 Public employees soon discovered that their wages and
benefits had fallen behind those of private employees.' In response
to the decline of their relative economic status, public employees began
to join unions in increasing numbers.5
In California, the number of employees in the public sector has
expanded dramatically in recent years. 6 This expansion has been ac-
companied by a corresponding increase in public employee union
1. Shaw and Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector Collec-
tive Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 867, 867 (1962). Government employees were not subject
to the periodic layoffs common in many private sector industries. Id. at n.3.
2. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Sector Relations, 85 HARVARD L.J. 459,
460 (1971).
3. See Shaw and Clark, supra note 1, at 867. In the period from 1948 to 1963, wages
in private manufacturing industries rose a total of 80%. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND
LABOR RELATIONS 414 (1964).
4. Shaw and Clark, supra note 1, at 867.
5. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
the largest union representing state and local government employees, increased its membership
from approximately 90,000 in 1960 to over 200,000 by 1970. SMIn, ME miFIELD AND ROTHSCHILD,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION, 856 (1970).
6. Comment, Collective Bargaining Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act: Should Local
Public Employees Have the Right to Strike? 35 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 523 (1984). Governmental
employee unions are the fastest growing sector of organized labor in California. Comment,
California Assembly Advisory Council's Recommendations on Impasse Resolution Procedures
and Public Employee Strikes, 11 SAN DIEoO L. REV. 473, 473 (1974). By August of 1983,
the state employed 294,500 workers, while local governments at the city and county level employed
999,700 workers. Employment Data and Research Div., Employment Dev. Department, California
Labor Market Bulletin Statistical Supplement 6 (1983).
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membership.7 Statistical analysis shows that the number of public
employee strikes in California has increased at a rate that corresponds
with the rate of growth of public employee unions.' With the growth
of public sector unionization, the strike has assumed greater impor-
tance for public employees.
Until the 1985 decision of the California Supreme Court in County
Sanitation District v. Los Angeles County Employees Association,'
California courts had applied the common law rule that in the absence
of an enabling statute, public employees did not have the right to
strike."0 In County Sanitation, the California Supreme Court recog-
nized, for the first time, the right of public employees to strike.II
The court, however, acknowledged an important exception to the rule
that public employees have the right to strike. This exception is that
public employee strikes may be prohibited where they affect "essen-
tial public services."
This comment will seek to ascertain which public employees will
fall within the "essential public services" exception to the County
Sanitation holding.' 3 In order to facilitate the discussion of which
employees are "essential," the comment initially will compare the right
to strike in the public and private sectors and analyze the status of
California law prior to County Sanitation."' Next, this comment will
look to the various meanings which have been attached to the term
"essential public services" in the case and statutory law of jurisdic-
tions other than California.'" In conclusion, a statute designed to
facilitate effective dispute resolution in California's public sector will
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 523.
8. In 1968, only 17 strikes occurred in the public sector. de Gialluly, Employment, Employee
Organization and Strike Trends in California Public Service, 5 CAL. Pun. aip. REL. 1, 1 (1970).
By 1979 that number had risen to 83 and in 1980 there were 53 strikes by public employees.
Div. of Labor Statistics, Dept. of Indus. Relations, Work Stoppages in California 6 (1983).
9. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
10. Stationary Engineers v. San Juan Water Dist., 90 Cal. App. 3d. 796, 801, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 666, 671 (1979); City of San Diego v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 310, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (1970).
11. 38 Cal. 3d at 569, 699 P.2d at 849 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438. "We conclude that the
common law prohibition against public sector strikes should no longer be recognized. Conse-
quently, strikes by public sector employees in this state are neither illegal or tortious
Id. at 586, 699 P.2d 835, 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438.
12. Id. at 586, 699 P.2d 835, 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438. "The right to strike is by
no means unlimited . . . The legislature has already prohibited strikes by firefighters under
any circumstance. It may conclude that other categories of public employees perform such essential
services that a strike would invariably result in imminent danger to the public health and safety,
and, therefore, must be prohibited." Id.
13. See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 17-55 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
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be proposed.'6 The proposed statute will include suggested methods
of dispute resolution in California's public sector.
COMPARISON OF THE RIGHT To STRIKE IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
The strike is frequently described as the "cutting edge" in labor
negotiations.' 7 The benefit of the strike as a method for resolving
labor disputes is that while the work stoppage is a potent weapon
against management, it also inflicts damage on the striking employee.' 8
Thus both sides are encouraged to work towards a speedy resolution
of the dispute.
Although the strike is now considered an appropriate tool for resolv-
ing labor disputes in the private sector,' 9 acceptance of strikes in the
public sector has been more circumspect.2" A key rationale for the
distinction between public and private sector strikes is that there are
significant restraints on union power in the private sector. For exam-
ple, wage increases won through a strike often lead to increased prices
in the finished product or service provided by private employees.',
Higher prices generally cause a decreased demand for the product.
2 2
Thus, excessive demands by private organized labor creates the risk
to a striking employee of job layoffs.23 A recent example of economic
constraints working to limit wage and benefit demands in the private
sector can be found in the wage concessions made by Chrysler Cor-
poration employees and the United Auto Workers (UAW) in 1981.
Chrysler Corporation had been faced with staggering economic losses
16. See infra notes 114-165 and accompanying text.
17. Lev, Strikes by Governmental Employees: Problems and Solutions, 57 A.B.A.J. 771,
771 (1971).
18. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 463. While strikes occur in only about two to three percent
of all private sector negotiations, many of the remaining peacefully negotiated contracts would
likely not be reached if it were not for the threat of a strike. Olson, The Use of the Right
to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LABOR L.J. 494, 494 (1982).
19. Hanslowe and Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Governmental Employees,
67 CORNELL L.J. 1055, 1055 (1982).
20. Id.
21. Comment, The Collective Bargaining Process at the Municipal Level Lingers in its
Chrysalis Stage, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 397, 410 (1974).
22. Id.
23. Id. "The strike is, after all, an instrument for applying economic coercion. In the
private sector, it has been an effective weapon in the hands of employees because employers
have been constrained by the need to compete in a product market or else go out of business.
But political, rather than economic, forces are the dominant constraints in the public sector."
Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 943, 957
(1970).
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and sought a loan from the federal government to help save the cor-
poration from bankruptcy." In order to survive as a corporate entity,
Chrysler asked for wage concessions from Chrysler employees. The
leaders of the UAW realized the gravity of the situation and recom-
mended that their workers take a thirteen percent pay cut which would
save Chrysler $622 million in wages.2" Prior to voting on the wage
concession package, union leaders told Chrysler employees that failure
to approve the concession would mean dissolution of the Chrysler
Corporation.2 6 Chrysler employees took the advice of union leaders
and approved the $622 million wage concession.27
A private employer is better situated to deal with a strike and ob-
tain a favorable settlement. When faced with a strike, the private
employer has several courses of action available. The first alternative
is simply to ride out the strike.28 A second choice would be to accede
to the demands of the union and pass the increased costs onto the
consumer.29 The final and most extreme alternative available to the
private employer is to go out of business.30
These same checks and balances are not available to the public sector
employer. In the public sector, employment often entails "essential"
services, inelastic demands, and few close substitutes for the services
provided.3' Therefore, in the public sector no such natural balance
occurs between the employers and employees interests.32 The sole con-
straint on public employees is in the budget allocation of responsible
legislators. 33
Unlike his counterpart in the private sector, the public employer
generally cannot simply discontinue service when faced with
unreasonable union demands. In situations where public health and
safety are involved, the government must continue to provide the ser-
vices no matter what the cost.34 Consequently, public employees have
greater power and can demand and receive greater benefits than their
private sector counterparts. 3 Two rationales have been advanced for
24. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at D5, col. 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981, at D1, col. 4.
28. Witt, The Public Sector Strike: Dilemma of the Seventies, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 102,
108 (1978).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Hanslowe and Acierno, supra note 19, at 1064.
32. Id.
33. Anderson, supra note 23, at 957.
34. ABOUD, TI RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 5 (1974).
35. Id.
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denying public employees the right to strike. The first is that allow-
ing public employees the right to strike puts undue pressure on elected
officials.36 Secondly, public employee strikes should be -prohibited
because the government is a "sovereign entity." 37
The political pressure argument asserts that when essential services
are denied, the voting public becomes restless and puts pressure on
officials to settle disputes as quickly as possible. The ultimate set-
tlement would be in favor of the employees because the pressure ap-
plied to political officials to resolve the dispute will override the long-
term interests of the governmental entity.39 The "sovereign entity"
argument views the strike as a blow to the government and a threat
to the political fiber of the nation, state or city involved in the
dispute. 0 To say that public employees can strike is the equivalent
of saying that they can "contravene the public welfare."'" For many
years, California courts used the common law rationale to deny public
employees the right to strike. 2 In order to appreciate the significance
of the California Supreme Court's holding in County Sanitation, the
pre-1985 law and rationale behind that law must be examined.
California Law Prior to County Sanitation
In California, except for firefighters who are expressly prohibited
by statute from striking,43 the legislature has not expressly permitted
or prohibited strikes by public employees. The Meyers-Milias-Brown
36. Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
78 YALE L.J. 1107,1123 (1969).
37. See Norwalk Teachers Assoc. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83 A.2d
482, 485 (1951). In Norwalk, the court eloquently elaborated the sovereignty argument stating:
"In the American System, sovereignty is inherent in the people. They can delegate it to a govern-
ment which they can create and operate by law. They can give the government the power and
authority to perform certain duties and furnish certain services. The government so created
and empowered must employ people to carry on its task. These people are the agents of the
government. They exercise some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status
entirely different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They serve the public welfare
and not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the equivalent of saying that they
can deny the authority of the government and contravene the public welfare." Id.
38. Wellington and Winter, supra note 36, at 1123.
39. Id.
40. See Olson, supra note 18, at 495.
41. 138 Conn. at 276, 83 A.2d at 485.
42. City of San Diego v. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, Local 127,
8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 312, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261 (1970); Almond v. County of Sacramento,
276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 34, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518, 520 (1969).
43. CAL. LAB. CODE §1962. Section 1962 provides, in part, that firefighters "shall have
the right to form, join or assist labor organizations to present grievances and recommendations
regarding wages, salaries, and working conditions to the governing body, and to discuss the
same with such organization but they shall not have the right to strike . . ." Id.
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Act (MMBA)4 4 establishes a framework of rights and protections for
public employees which, in many respects, closely mirrors those en-
joyed by workers in the private sector."5 The legislature, however,
has intentionally avoided enacting any provision which could be con-
sidered either a blanket grant or prohibition of the right to strike.4 6
Interpretation of statutory provisions dealing with the rights of workers
in the public sector has been left to the courts.
When a California statute is substantially similar to a federal statute,
California courts may look to a federal precedent for guidance." The
federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)4' gives public sec-
tor employees the right to bargain collectively and to engage in "other
concerted activities." The phrase "other concerted activities" has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to include strikes.49
Unlike LMRA, the MMBA makes no mention of "other concerted
activities." 5 At least one commentator has argued that the omission
could indicate the reluctance of the California Legislature to expressly
recognize a right to strike in the MMBA.' On the other hand, the
silence of the legislature could represent an implicit recognition of
public employees right to strike. 2 Thus, California statutory law has
left the issue of public employees right to strike shrouded in ambiguity.
Until the California Supreme Court decided County Sanitation in
May of 1985, California courts applied the common law rule that
in absence of an enabling statute, public employees do not have the
right to strike. 3 The California Supreme Court declined to render
a decision giving guidance in the area of whether public employees
have the right to strike."4 The explanation for this reluctance to render
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§3500-3510.
45. 38 Cal. 3d at 573, 699 P.2d at 841, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
46. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in
the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 719 (1972).
47. See Solano County Employees Ass'n. v. Solano County, 136 Cal. App. 3d 156, 160,
186 Cal. Rptr. 147, 150 (1982).
48. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1982).
49. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 474 (1955).
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE §3502.
51. See Comment, supra note 6, at 528.
52. Comment, Public Employee Legislation: An Emerging Paradox, Impact and Oppor-
tunity, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 931, 953 (1976).
53. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 310, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 260; 94 Cal. App. 2d at 46, 210 P.2d at 312.
54. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. City of Gridley,
34 Cal. 3d 191, 199, 666 P.2d 960, 964, 193 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1983) ("In the instant case,
the union has not contested the city's assertion that the strike was illegal; we may therefore
assume, for the purposes of analysis that it was."); San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 593 P.2d 838, 842, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 (1979) ("We need not
consider whether the strike was illegal since we hold that the city has no power under the
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a decision was that if public employees are unhappy about a labor
situation, the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts."
In response to sharp criticism for leaving the issue of public employees
right to strike undecided, the California Supreme Court attempted
to give definitive guidance in County Sanitation.
County Sanitation
In County Sanitation, the plaintiff was one of twenty-seven sanita-
tion districts within Los Angeles County and was responsible for the
operation and maintenance of sewage treatment and transport facilities
throughout the county.56 Approximately seventy-five percent of the
Los Angeles County Sanitation District's employees went out on strike
after negotiations between the district and the union for a new wage
and benefit agreement reached an impasse. 7 The district filed suit
seeking an injunction to terminate the strike and recovery of monetary
damages." The trial court granted and the appellate court affirmed
a judgment in favor of the sanitation district. 9 This decision, however,
was reversed by the California Supreme Court. The court stated "that
the common law prohibition against public sector strikes should not
be recognized in this state.""0
The court recognized an important exception to the rule that public
employees have the right to strike. The exception is that public
employee strikes may be prohibited where they affect "essential public
services the disruption of which would seriously threaten the public
health or safety." 6 ' The court, however, did not elaborate on which
activities would be considered "essential public services." 62
While the decision did not lend guidance regarding which services
should be considered essential, the court expressly stated that:
[T]he legislature could conclude that certain categories of public
employees perform such essential services that a strike would in-
MMBA to revoke the union's recognition for engaging in strike activity, legal or illegal.");
City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 912, 534 P.2d 403, 417, 120
Cal. Rptr. 707, 721 (1975).
55. Newmaker v. Regents of the University of California, 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 646,
325 P.2d 558, 564 (1958).
56. 38 Cal. 3d at 568, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 569, 699 P.2d at 837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
60. Id. at 585, 699 P.2d at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
61. Id. at 580, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
62. Id. The County Sanitation court used law enforcement and firefighting personnel as
examples of "essential public services." Id. at 581 n.26, 699 P.2d at 846 n.26, 214 Cal. Rptr.
at 435 n.26.
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variably result in imminent danger to the public health and safety
and must therefore be prohibited."3
Because the California Supreme Court established the essential public
services test, but failed to give guidance on what constitutes an essential
public service, a thorough analysis of what should constitute an "essen-
tial" public service is warranted.
Essential Public Services
The confusion that has existed over exactly which public services
should be considered "essential" was perhaps best elaborated in the
final report of the California Advisors Council on Public Employee
Relations which stated:
It is relatively easy to gain consensus that police and fire protection
are essential services and that some minor clerical functions are not.
But in respect of the great number of services that lie between the
two poles of absolute essentiality and absolute nonessentiality there
is not even the beginning of consensus, only disagreement."'
At one extreme is the view that all governmental services are "essen-
tial" because the demand for them is inelastic and because disrup-
tion of public services may seriously injure the public health and
safety.' 5 A former Secretary of Labor of the United States asserted
that "every governmental function is 'essential' in the broadest term.
If it weren't, the government shouldn't be doing it.""'
Under this broad approach, school teachers are just as "essential"
as police and firefighters. 67 The only difference between the services
is that the costs and losses from being without fire and police depart-
ments are much more immediate than the effect of being without
teachers.'8 Because of the great influence educators have on future
generations in terms of importance to the future health and vitality
of this nation, school teachers and other "nonessential" employees
may have a greater long-term impact on society than either police
or fire protection. 6' Additional support for the position classifying
63. Id. at 581, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
64. California State Assembly, Final Report of the Assembly Advisors Council on Public
Employee Relations (March 15, 1973).
65. See Wellington and Winter, supra note 36, at 1123.
66. Address by Willard W. Wirtz, 16th International Convention of American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees in April, 1966. Hanslowe and Acierno, supra note
19, at 1069.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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all governmental employees as "essential" is that it would be ad-
ministratively unrealistic to do otherwise.7" Distinguishing between
"essential" and "nonessential" governmental employees may lead to
tedious and unproductive litigation."
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that the right to
strike in the public sector should be unlimited and that no govern-
mental service is "essential."" According to this view, if there is suf-
ficient demand for a particular public service, the private sector will
quickly adjust and provide any service which public employees refuse
to perform." The advocates of an unlimited right to strike for public
employees are misguided because even the private sector right to strike
is subject to limitation. For example, private sector strikes are limited
during times of national emergency and where the strike is intended
to pressure neutral individuals."
The better view, and the one that was intended by the California
Supreme Court in County Sanitation, is that only some governmental
services are "essential." '7 6 Apparently, this is the view of the United
States Supreme Court as expressed in Transportation Union v. Long
Island R.R. Co." In Transportation Union, the Court stated that "it
is the nature of the service provided which determines its essentiality."
7
The Transportation Union decision was accorded heavy weight by the
California Supreme Court in County Sanitation.9 Several factors have
been isolated that courts should consider in making a final determina-
tion of which public services are "essential." 8
A. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN MAKING ESSENTIALITY
DETERMINATION
When analyzing the nature of a service, several factors should be
70. See Lev, supra note 17, at 777 n.4.
71. Id.
72. Burton and Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79
YALE L.J. 418, 420-21 (1970).
73. Id.
74. Olson, supra note 18, at 496.
75. Id.
76. 38 Cal. 3d at 581, 699 P.2d at 851, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
77. 455 U.S. 678 (1979).
78. Id. at 678.
79. 38 Cal. 3d at 580-81, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435. The Transportation
Union case underscores the conclusion that it is the nature of the service provided and the
impact of its disruption on the public welfare which determines essentiality, as opposed to
the simplistic determination of whether the service is provided by public or private employees. Id.
80. Wellington and Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 441, 442
(1970).
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taken into consideration.' The most important of these factors is
whether the strike poses an immediate threat to the public health and
safety."2 The explanation for making the potential threat to the public
the most important factor can perhaps best be illustrated by an ex-
ample of the harm a strike by public employees may cause. In 1969,
police officers in the City of Montreal went on strike. 3 During the
first few hours of the walkout, robberies occurred at eight banks,
one finance company, two groceries, and a jewelry store. 4 Eyewitnesses
reported that everyday people, not hoodlums or habitual criminals,
were committing offenses such as burglary. Motorists were driving
through red lights and on the wrong side of the road because they
realized that no one would catch them. 5
Another factor relevant to whether a service provided by a public
employee is "essential" is the relative availability of substitutes for
the service.8 An example of how the availability of substitutes may
weigh heavily in a court's determination of the essentiality of a ser-
vice can be found in the Pennsylvania case of Highland Sewer and
Water Authority v. Local Union 459.87 In Highland Sewer and Water,
a Pennsylvania court held that the sewer and water district was not
entitled to an injunction which would have forced striking employees
back to work. 88 The basis for the refusal by the court to grant the
injunction was that since it was possible for the services to be per-
formed by supervisory personnel or subcontracted out, there was no
clear and present danger to public health, safety or welfare and,
therefore, an injunction would be improper.8 9
Finally, a public service may become "essential" if public employees
perform a service the disruption of which would cause serious in-
convenience to the public. 90 The degree to which the public is in-
convenienced by the disruption of a public service depends upon the
nature of the service. For example, in the case of employees who
furnish "essential" services, such as police officers, the public may
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Burton and Krider, supra note 72, at 433-34 (story reprinted from N.Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1969, at 3, col. 1).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Wellington and Winter, supra note 81, at 442.
87. Pa. D. & C.2d 564 (1973).
88. Id. at 565-67.
89. Id.
90. see ABOUD, supra note 34, at 7.
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not be able to tolerate any strikes. In borderline cases, such as school
teacher labor stoppages, the public may be able to tolerate short strikes.
In the case of "nonessential" services, such as municipal golf course
employees, strikes could be tolerated indefinitely.' Thus, the greater
the inconvenience to the voting public, the less tolerable a strike will
become. Other states have used these factors in formulating their ap-
proaches to the right of public employees to strike.
B. APPROACH OF OTHER STATES
Several states have granted public employees a limited right to
strike.92 Most of these states are in agreement that strikes by police
officers and firefighters should be expressly prohibited.93 Beyond this
point of agreement, however, the various states have differing methods
of dealing with public sector strikes. Three of the more well-reasoned
statutes dealing with public sector strikes are those of Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, and Alaska.
The Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act94 expressly prohibits
strikes by police and firefighters. Instead the law requires disputes
to be settled by binding arbitration. 95 Strikes by all other public
employees are presumptively valid.9 6 A governmental employer may
rebut the presumption of validity by showing either that mediation
and fact-finding alternatives have not been exhausted or that the strike
would endanger public health, safety or welfare.97 The reason for grant-
ing a limited right to strike was elaborated in the Pennsylvania Gover-
nor's Commission Report.98 The report stressed that public sentiment
is an important reason to grant a limited right to strike:
The limitations on the right to strike which we propose . . . will
appeal to the general public as so much fairer than a general ban
on strikes that the public will be less likely to tolerate strikes beyond
these boundaries. Strikes can only be effective so long as they have
91. Id.
92. Those ten states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wisconsin. 38 Cal.3d at 569 n.8, 699 P.2d at 838 n.8, 214 Cal. Rptr.
at 427 n.8.
93. Id. at 581, 699 P.2d at 846, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §1101.1003 (1983).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Governor's Commission to Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania, Report
and Recommendations, reprinted in 251 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) E-l, E-3 (1968). For
further discussion of this report see Hanslowe and Acierno, supra note 19, at 1055.
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public support. In short, we look upon the limited and carefully
defined right to strike as a safety valve which will prevent strikes. 99
The state of Hawaii has also granted public employees a limited right
to strike.' 0 The Hawaii statute provides that employees may strike
after they have exhausted statutory procedures, including a cooling-
off period.'' If the strike endangers the public health or safety,
however, the public employer may petition the Hawaii Public Employ-
ment Relations Board, which will investigate. If the Board finds that
there is an imminent or present threat to public health or safety, "the
Board shall set requirements that must be complied with to avoid
or remove any such imminent or present danger."' 2 Other states,
such as Alaska, have agreed with the wisdom of the Pennsylvania
and Hawaii legislatures and have granted public employees a limited
right to strike.
The Alaska statute places public employees into one of three
categories.' 3 In the first category are those services which may not
be given up for even the shortest period of time. Thus far the Alaska
legislature has included only police and fire protection employees,
prison guards and other correctional employees within this category.
Employees in the first category are forbidden from striking in all
circumstances.' 4 The second classification includes services which may
be interrupted for a limited but not indefinite period of time.
Employees that fall within this category are public utility, snow
removal, sanitation and public school employees. Courts may enjoin
a strike by these employees if the strike begins to threaten "the health,
safety or welfare of the public."' 15 The third category includes ser-
vices in which work stoppages may be sustained for extended periods
without serious effect on the public. All public employees who do
not perform category one or category two services are included in
category three. A strike by category three employees is legal as long
as it has been approved by a majority of the striking unit. 06 Ap-
plication of principles similar to those adopted by Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, and Alaska could provide California with a workable stan-
dard for determining which governmental services are "essential." A
99. Id.
100. HAwAII REv. STAT. §89-12(a) (1981).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ALASKA STAT. §23.40.200 (1981).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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statute is necessary to avoid the use of vague standards by the judiciary,
such as "when the strike threatens public health, safety and welfare,"
to determine when a public employee strike may be enjoined." 7 In
fact, Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate opinion in County Sanita-
tion because she believed that "it is only fair to give the legislature
some guidance."'0 8 Noting that to allow the legislature to decide which
services are essential without guidance "not only invites error but en-
courages it."' 9
Additional support for the necessity of statutory clarification of
which public employee groups perform "essential public services" can
be gained from the recent United States Supreme Court opinion of
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority."l0 The Supreme
Court found the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" to
be "unworkable.""' The Court recognized that having lower courts
apply the "traditional governmental functions" test on a case-by-case
basis led to inconsistent results and confusion. ' 2 While the San
Antonio Transit case involved an entirely different area of law, the
case did illustrate the difficulties of a case-by-case analysis using a
vague standard like the "essential public services" test suggested in
County Sanitation."3 Thus California is in need of a statute similar
to the ones of Pennsylvania, Hawaii and Alaska to provide Califor-
nia courts with consistent guidelines.
Proposed California Statute
California would benefit from a three-tiered statute similar to that
enacted by the State of Alaska. The Alaska statute has proven suc-
cessful in settling public employee labor disputes during the first few
years of operation. In the first year and a half after enactment, only
one labor dispute failed to be resolved prior to the strike stage.' 4
Impasse resolution procedures similar to those contained in the Alaska
statute have been effective for Hawaii as well." 5 In the early years
of the Hawaii statute, only two strikes by public employees have
107. See ABOuD, supra note 34, at 29.
108. 38 Cal.3d at 593, 699 P.2d at 855, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
Ill. Id. at 1009.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1021.
114. ABouD, supra note 34, at 20.
115. HAvAII REv. STAT. §89-12(a) (1981).
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occurred.'6 There are some additional steps, however, which can be
taken by the California legislature to facilitate effective dispute resolu-
tion. Specific proposals for a California statute are set forth below.
A. CATEGORY ONE OF CALIFORNIA STATUTE
Category One of the California statute should closely resemble the
first category of the Alaska statute. Into this category fall those ser-
vices which cannot be interrupted for even a short period of time.
The legislature must determine which services should be placed in this
category. Because of the potential harm to the public and lack of
adequate private sector substitutes, likely candidates are police of-
ficers, firefighters and guards at correctional facilities. Persons fall-
ing within this category would be forbidden from striking under any
circumstance. The California statute must provide a substitute dispute
resolution procedure to ensure that public employees falling within
this category are able to engage in meaningful collective bargaining.
Arbitration is one substitute that has been used effectively in other
states. " I7
The effectiveness of arbitration in the private sector and its poten-
tial for dispute resolution in the California public sector make ar-
bitration a viable alternative to the strike."' Arbitration has gained
favor in the public sector, as it has in the private sector, because
it often avoids needless and expensive litigation and provides a
substitute for the "open warfare" of strikes."' Since arbitration af-
fords employees the opportunity to have their cause heard and decided
by an experienced, neutral third party, it imposes a sense of impar-
tial justice that contributes to a more harmonious relationship be-
tween the disputing parties.'20
While arbitration has been highly successful in the private sector,
there is some question whether this practice is appropriate in the public
sector.'' Several cases have been litigated on the theory that arbitra-
tion is inappropriate because to permit an outside arbitrator to make
the final decision on future wages, hours and working conditions con-
116. ABOUD, supra note 34, at 20.
117. In Pennsylvania, over 60 cases have been successfully arbitrated under the new Penn-
slyvania law. Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration Under United States Statutes, 22 N.Y.U. Con-
ference on Labor 259, 275 (1970).
118. See Comment, supra note 21, at 413.
119. Vause, LABoR ARBITRATION IN STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1981).
120. Id.
121. Comment, California Assembly Advisory Council's Recommendations on Impasse
Resolution Procedures and Public Employee Strikes, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 482, 482 (1974).
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stitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power.' 22 The Supreme
Courts of Wyoming,123 Rhode Island,"' Pennsylvania,'25  and
Wisconsin, 26 however, have held that the submission of public
employee grievances to arbitration does not constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. Still others argue that arbitration will
destroy the collective bargaining process and the desire of the parties
to settle their own disputes. 2 7 A third party, who would have no
continuing responsibility for the decision, would have binding power
to resolve disputes.' 28 The experience of Pennsylvania, however, in-
dicates that arbitration is a highly effective method of dispute resolu-
tion and that arbitration does not destroy the parties' desire to reach
an agreement.' 29 In Canada, where arbitration is commonly used to
settle public labor disputes, the effectiveness of the arbitration op-
tion was judged by the President of the Canadian Treasury Board
to be "just as strong a conciliation device ... as the strike route."' 30
Where compulsory arbitration is used, procedures must be developed
to ensure that the parties are forced to negotiate extensively before
submitting any grievance to arbitration.' Premature arbitration can
be spotted through the existence of several signs. A strong indication
that arbitration is premature is when there are multiple unresolved
issues at the time the dispute is submitted to arbitration.' 3 2 Another
indication of early arbitration is that parties might show a total lack
of understanding of the other parties' position.'33 If either of these
conditions is present, the arbitrator should refuse to hear the case
until further mediation and fact-finding procedures have been
exhausted. '31
122. Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal.3d. 601, 28 P.2d 834 (1982); Redwood City v. Moore,
231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
123. Wyoming v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). In this case, the Wyoming
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a compulsory arbitration statute for firefighters. The
court explicitly rejected the argument that arbitration constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
of power. Id. at 299.
124. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969).
125. Harvey v. Russo, 225 A.2d 460 (Penn. 1969).
126. Rhinelander City Employees, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 214,
151 N.W., 2d 30, 34 (1967).
127. See Comment, supra note 21, at 411.
128. Id.
129. See Anderson, supra note 117, at 275.
130. Address by C.N. Drury, Joint Conference on Collective Bargaining in Federal Public
Service, Nov. 20, 1968, as reprinted in 67 MICH. L. REv. at 961.
131. Coulson, PUBLIC SaCTOR BARGAINING: ISSUaS AND RBSPONSILITIES 156 (1978).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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B. CATEGORY Two OF THE CAUFORNIA STATUTE
Category Two of the California statute should consist of those ser-
vices which may be interrupted for a limited period of time. Employees
falling within this category are school teachers, emergency medical
personnel, public utility and transit workers. This group of public
employees would be permitted to strike, but only after extensive im-
passe resolution procedures have been exhausted. Category Two of
the California statute should contain several types of impasse resolu-
tion procedures which have proven effective in other states.
1. Mediation
Mediation is the intervention of a neutral third party, usually a
governmental appointee, in the bargaining process for the purpose of
helping the parties reach an agreement.' 35 There is widespread agree-
ment that mediation is the most desirable technique of third party
intervention.'3 6 Support for mediation stems from the fact that it in-
volves minimal interference with the bargaining process. ,37 In media-
tion an experienced third party brings a fresh perspective into a dispute
and the mediator can be an effective catalyst in moving the parties
toward agreement.'3 The distinction between mediation and arbitra-
tion is important to understand. The mediator is generally without
authority to make a binding decision, while the arbitrator has the
authority to adjudicate and make binding decisions.' 39 In other words,
"the essential job of the mediator is to persuade the parties; it is
up to the parties to persuade the arbitrator."'""
The real strength of mediation is that the technique often has the
effect of educating relatively inexperienced public sector negotiators
about the labor bargaining process, and the mediation process helps
to familiarize each party with the position of the other party.' 4' One
of the goals of mediation is that the greater understanding achieved
through the mediation negotiations will make the parties more will-
ing to settle the dispute as quickly as possible.' 42 Mediation has been
135. SMITH, MERRIFIELD & ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION
32 (1970).
136. GRODIN, WOLLETT & ALLEYNE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 269
(1979).
137. Id. at 270.
139. Id.
139. See SMITH, MERRIFIELD & ROTHSCHILD, supra note 135, at 32.
140. Id.
141. Gilroy and Sinieropi, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, U.S. Department of
Labor 58 (1972).
142. Id.
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highly successful in the states which have used the technique to resolve
employee grievances. For example, in New York, nearly fifty percent
of the public employee disputes going to mediation are settled suc-
cessfully.' 3 In New Jersey, nearly seventy percent of all public
employee disputes going to mediation have been settled.'44 Because
of the successful results achieved through mediation, the mediation
impasse resolution technique should be required of Category Two
public employees for the first thirty days of the strike. However, media-
tion should not be the only technique available to resolve disputes.
Other effective impasse resolution techniques such as fact-finding
should also be used.
2. Fact-Finding
Fact-finding is another approach to dispute resolution that should
be required by the California statute. The public sector has relied
heavily on this technique in attempting to resolve impasses in interest
disputes.' 5
The term "fact-finding" is misleading because it implies that the
sole function of the fact-finder is to hear and weigh evidence and
make findings of fact. In actuality, fact-finders, after reaching find-
ings, make recommendations to the parties as to what would be a
fair settlement of the dispute. 4 6 Fact-finding requires the parties to
gather objective data and present their arguments based on this data.
In this forum, an unsubstantiated demand carries little weight."4 7 At
least twenty states have already adopted some version of fact-finding
as a dispute resolution mechanism and approximately ninety percent of
the disputes which have involved this method have been resolved
without a strike.'4 " Even with the resounding success of the media-
tion and fact-finding techniques, the California statute should still
provide the additional safeguard of the cooling-off period.
3. Cooling-Off Period
The California statute should provide a cooling-off period if the
mediation and fact-finding impasse resolution procedures prove
143. GRODIN, WoLLETT & ALLEYNE, supra note 136, at 270.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 271.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Gilroy and Sinicropi, supra note 141, at 58.
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unsuccessful.' 49 During the cooling-off period the parties would be
expected to continue bargaining.5 0 In the event the dispute is not
settled during the cooling- off period, the workers, in accordance with
County Sanitation, would enjoy a limited right to strike.
C. CATEGORY THREE OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE
All public employees who do not fall within either of the above
two categories will be included in Category Three of the California
statute. These "nonessential" employees will be given the absolute
right to strike after certain impasse resolution procedures have been
exhausted. The impasse procedures are necessary because even strikes
by the most "nonessential" public employees such as city park
gardeners and mail room workers could eventually have a harmful
effect on the public.' 5' In addition to the mediation, fact-finding
and cooling-off methods, there are two other methods which might
be appropriately used in Category Three. These two methods have
been termed the "nonstoppage strike" and the "graduated strike."
1. Nonstoppage Strike
The nonstoppage strike could be declared by a public employee
union after all other impasse resolution procedures had failed to pro-
duce a settlement.' 52 Employees would be obliged to continue work-
ing full-time but a portion of their wages would be deposited in a
special fund.'53 In addition to paying regular wages, the employer
would also be required to deposit into the special fund an extra amount
equal to the amount given up by the employees.' 5 The union would
have the option of increasing the amount put into the fund by ten
percent every two weeks.'" This type of strike would put financial
pressure on both public officials and public employee unions without
disrupting the flow of public services.' 6
149. Anderson, supra note 23, at 950.
150. Id.
151. Hanslowe and Acierno, supra note 19, at 1069.
152. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 470.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 473.
156. Id.
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2. Graduated Strike
If the nonstoppage strike proves unsuccessful, the next step would
be the graduated strike. In a graduated strike, the union would call
work to halt in stages.' For example, during the early stages of the
strike, the employees would not work for one full day.15 Of course,
the employees, take-home pay would be cut proportionately. The value
of this type of work stoppage would be to give the public a taste
of reduced service without the shock of total deprivation.' 59 If the
graduated strike proved unsuccessful, public employees would be free
to engage in a full scale labor strike. 160
D. Post Strike Determination
One problem with the application of a statute delineating a limited
right to strike is the difficulty in determining the essentiality of many
public services in advance.' 6' The opinion of the court in County
Sanitation stated that "essential" public employees could be prohibited
from striking. However, the court did not state at what point the
determination of essentiality is to be made.1
62
In those cases where essentiality can only be determined after a
strike is in progress, the courts or an impartial agency should be given
the power to designate certain services as "essential" after the strike
has begun. 63 The injunction has become a standard tool of state and
local governments for implementing a "no strike" policy in the public
sector.' 61 State anti-injunction statutes, prohibiting or limiting the use
of injunctions in labor disputes have been held to have no applica-
tion in the public sector.' 65 California courts should be expressly given
the power to enjoin strikes by public employees in situations where
the strike presents a clear and present danger to the public health
or safety.
Conclusion
This comment has focused upon the "essential public services" ex-
157. Id. at 474.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 475.
160. Id.
161. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 952.
162. 38 Cal. 3d at 585, 699 P.2d at 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
163. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 950.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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ception to the California Supreme Court's holding in County Sanita-
tion District v. Los Angeles County Employees Association which
granted public employees a limited right to strike. While the County
Sanitation holding granted a limited right to strike, the court did not
elaborate on which public employees would not be allowed to strike.
This comment has illustrated that while it is relatively easy to gain con-
sensus that police and fire protection are "essential" services, and
some minor clerical jobs are not, that there is no consensus on what
constitutes an "essential public service."
The statutes of other states, such as Pennsylvania, Hawaii and
Alaska, provide important guidance on how to deal with the prob-
lems which will soon face the California legislature. California would
be wise to use a modified version of the three category approach used
in Alaska. By providing mandatory special impasse procedures such
as arbitration, mediation and fact-finding, the California Legislature
can assure that crippling public employee strikes will only occur as
a last resort. If the proposed statute is followed, both public employee
unions and public employee management will benefit. The unions will
be provided with tools which will force management to engage in mean-
ingful collective bargaining and the free flow of "essential" public
services will be preserved.
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